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Abstract
Contact tracing requires a strong understanding of the context of a user, and location
provides the most ideal context for any infection encounter. Although Bluetooth
technology gives a good insight into the proximity aspect of an encounter, it does
not provide any location context related to it which helps taking better decisions.
Using the ideas presented in this paper, one shall be able to obtain this valuable
information. All of this within the purview of Google/Apple Exposure Notification
(GAEN) specification, while preserving complete user privacy. There are four
ways of propagating context between any two users. Two of them allow private
location logging, without revealing their location history within an app. The other
two are encryption-based methods. The first encryption method is a variant of
Apple’s FindMy protocol, that allows nearby Apple devices to capture the GPS
location of a lost Apple device. The second encryption is a minor modification
of the existing GAEN protocol, so that GPS information is available to a healthy
phone only when it is exposed - this is a better option comparatively. It will still be
the role of Public Health smartphone app to decide, on how to use the location-time
context, to build a full-fledged contact tracing and public health solution. Lastly,
we highlight the benefits and potential privacy issues with each of these context
propagation methods proposed here.
1 Motivation
Currently, exposure notification obtained from GAEN, only reports the day of an exposure, but does
not give any details such as their location or time. We believe that the context of location and time
become critical for (i) a user to self-assess their exposure (e.g. if they were wearing a mask, or
maintaining social distance at that moment) and inform about the same to those who were around
them, or in case they were not carrying their smartphone at all at that point in time, (ii) improve
user’s trust in the system to reject false-positives (e.g. if they had picked up BLE signal from behind
a wall), (iii) help public health officials to perform contact tracing operations more accurately, also
requires knowledge of the context (e.g. to request all those attending a wedding to self-isolate at
their homes, if an infected person was observed to be at that place, and for a long duration). Lack
of context and the lack of an agency can lead to irrational behavior, and civil unrest as explained
in our document Contact Tracing: Holistic Solution beyond Bluetooth. A user’s behaviour and
the level of precautionary measures they may need to take may vary depending on their specific
circumstances. The risk from an exposure to a carrier also varies in different situations. Thus, the
need for spatio-temporal context becomes imperative in contact tracing. Beyond location, there are
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many other context factors which can be utilized such as - Barometer reading, Ambient light sensor
reading, magnetometer reading, gyroscope reading and etc. These sensor reading can unlock the
potential of improving the false positive and false negative issues inherently associated with the
bluetooth technology Leith & Farrell (2020)
Our goal is to enable location-time context to be delivered to the user during exposure notification.
Here are a few possibilities and challenges.
• Log location by the same app
An app could be rejected for storing time or location along with its Bluetooth packets,
which makes it non-compliant under the current specification of Google/Apple Exposure
Notification (GAEN) API.
• Use a secondary app
One can store the GPS trails along with their timestamp using another app, which creates
the issue of communication between these two apps, and also prevents mass adoption, as
only a small percentage would install and run both these apps in parallel.
• Reuse ENIN information
The GAEN approved app can estimate timestamp from ENIN, which is windowed at every
ten minutes and uses a tolerance window of ±2 hours during the diagnosis key matching.
So, one way of achieving this is to use the existing protocol, and use ENIN timestamp from
the Bluetooth payload as a primary key between the two databases, and look up GPS for
intersecting code using another app.
Another important aspect of contact tracing that has been completely overlooked by a majority of
existing Bluetooth-based approaches is the lack of assistance for the Policy Makers, Epidemiologists,
City Officials, Response Teams, etc. With the availability of location context in a contact tracing app,
it would enable the covid positive citizens, to give their consent more effectively, while providing
data to the aforementioned decision-makers; and this could shape the policy significantly, to a level
where the outcomes could drastically change, if right interventions are performed.
2 Related Work
A significant amount of work has been done around contact tracing in the last six months of the
COVID-19 outbreak. Raskar et al. (2020a) and Li & Guo (2020) provide a comprehensive survey of
the contact tracing ecosystem across different parameters. In this work we are mainly interested in
the bluetooth based protocol built by Google gae (2020d) and Apple gae (2020a) which circumvents
the system level problem known with the bluetooth in background for the phones and hence has been
adopted widely across many countries and states. There are few other protocols which also utilize
bluetooth for proximity sensing Chan et al. (2020); Trieu et al. (2020), however, they suffer with the
same issue of the hardware compatibility which stops any app from running in the background in
iOS. Goal of this work is to ensure privacy and ethical aspects Raskar et al. (2020b) while providing
a user some context about the exposure which will make the contact tracing more effective.
3 SafePaths protocol to combine GPS + GAEN
We propose a protocol that stays completely within the boundaries of GAEN specification for both the
bluetooth gae (2020b) as well as cryptography gae (2020c), based on the idea that GPS information
is made available to a healthy phone, only when it is exposed to an infected person around. If Alice is
healthy and comes in proximity to Bob, who later was diagnosed Covid+, then Alice will be able to
see the location (and time) of that encounter, but rest of her location history shall remain invisible or
encrypted - based on minor modification to GAEN, as suggested here. We also propose three other
ideas, that do not require any modifications to the GAEN protocol, but rather require Google/Apple
to allow apps to access the GPS privately on the device and to run independent servers.
Using BLE for proximity, and GPS for context exclusively, the 4 privacy preserving solutions we
propose that provide location-time context can be summarized as follows:
1. GPS logs stay on device app, does not leave the phone, and no visualization
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2. GPS + Time blurred and logged on device, data does not leave the phone, no visualization
3. FindMy variant: Encrypt RPI
4. GAEN variant: Encrypt your own GPS with DailyKey, and Broadcast it over BLE
Please refer to this document for GAEN terminology that has been used here.
Unless stated specifically, a Healthy person is X (Alice), and a person who gets diagnosed of Covid
is Y (Bob).
BT : Bluetooth
BLE : Bluetooth Low Energy
RPI : Rolling Proximity Identifiers, are privacy-preserving identifiers that are broadcast in Bluetooth
payload
ENIN : Exposure Number Interval Number (Index of a 10 min window, 144 such windows per day)
DailyKey : Diagnosis Keys, a subset of which becomes Temporary Exposure Keys (previously known
as Daily Tracing Keys)
1. GPS logs stay on device app, data does not leave the phone, and cannot be visualized
Approach 1 - based on direct RPI indexing: Every user logs their location, in-
dexed with RPI. When exposure notification arrives, it matches the RPI with the logged
location. We store the location only if there is RPI (which means another BT user was
encountered). In this case the database of GPS is indexed with RPI.
Approach 2 - based on calculated ENIN: The 144 RPIs generated from the DailyKey
provides a match with one of the RPIs (10 minute window) so app has access to the
timestamp. From that timestamp, the app can recover the GPS location for that time. In this
case the database of GPS is indexed with time.
No direct visualization of location log is made available to the user, to prevent unauthorized
persons (nosy employers, abusive spouses or border agents) from seeing it.
Benefits
• Location data stays local and casual unauthorized reader cannot see it (e.g. nosy
employer, abusive spouse).
Issues
• The app could get rejected, because it stores location log, which is against the GAEN
guidelines.
• Sophisticated hackers can reverse engineer the exact location from logs.
2. BLE for proximity, GPS for context, GPS is blurred for privacy, data does not leave
the phone, and cannot be visualized
This is our recommended protocol if GAEN and GPS APIs can co-exist.
Same as solution 1, but the location-time is quantized in space-time, in order to blur it
before storing locally on the phone. For example, based on the local population density,
the blur can be about 200m in a city or 1km in the suburbs. With the help of user’s own
memory, the user can figure out where the exposure encounter could have happened.
Benefits
• A nosy employer cannot see specific location data.
• A sophisticated hacker who can reverse engineer, cannot get the exact location because
it has been quantized.
Issues
• Context could be reduced significantly, and hence this method appears to bring the
classic dogma of utility vs privacy tradeoff.
• Context could also be wrong in some cases.
• Possibility of on-the-fly attacks, when an attacker has prior knowledge of the precise
location.
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3. GPS is encrypted with the RPI of an infected person
Borrowing the concept of “upload what you heard” described in FindMy protocol. Every
user encrypts their own GPS value, using public key of the user nearby and stores them
locally. The healthy user phone then downloads the DailyKey and computes the list of
RPIs that are related to it, and checks for the intersections if any with the list of heard RPIs
using the existing GAEN API. Using which the corresponding encrypted location data is
decrypted using their own private key. Note that both UUIDx and PublicKeyx keep rotating
at every 15 minutes interval. Rotating PublicKeyx while keeping the same PrivateKeyx
in an efficient manner is non-trivial, hence we propose to use the already built-in FindMy
device protocol by Apple.
Algorithm 1: Encryption of context with infected person’s RPI
X is a healthy person and Y is infected;
X emits (UUIDx, PublicKeyx);
Y receives (UUIDx, PublicKeyx);
Y encrypts its own GPS as D = Encrypt(PublicKeyx, GPSy) at this point;
stores it locally (GPSx == GPSy);
Y gets identified as infected;
Y uploads the data it had stored into a diagnosis server (UUIDx, Dx);
X pulls data from the diagnosis server;
X performs a comparison, and finds a match with its UUIDx;
X uses its own PrivateKeyx obtains: GPSx = Decrypt(PrivateKeyx, Dx)
Challenges
• Scalability, as this would need a lot of public keys to be encrypted
• A sophisticated attacker could reverse engineer the key X
4. GPS in existing GAEN protocol
“Upload what you broadcasted” as in GAEN protocol (as well as MIT PACT). In the
following proposals we extend the existing GAEN scheme to allow context sharing. We
propose two ways for this: one is based on Asymmetric key infrastructure, while the other is
based on Symmetric key infrastructure.
Our goal is to use the new Associated Encrypted Metadata (AEM) supported in GAEN.
AEM currently is for the purpose of sharing BLE signal strength. We assume that we can
append GPS value into this metadata, which gets broadcast over the BLE.
Using this protocol, Alice can recover the GPS location of her contact (and hence her own
location) only for locations for which she received the Exposure Notification. She does not
have access to the rest of her location history or the infected person’s location history.
(a) Using Asymmetric key encryption - Algo Steps
Every device has a Rotating Public Key - RPublicKey, and a single PrivateKey. This
RPublicKey is different from the RPI, that is used in GAEN. We aim to encrypt the
GPS with this RPublicKey, and the healthy user can then recover the encrypted GPS,
using the corresponding PrivateKey downloaded from the server.
RPI = Rolling Proximity Identifiers (broadcast over BLE as in GAEN),
RPublicKey = Rotating Public Key (RPublicKey and a single PrivateKey)
4
Algorithm 2: Asymmetric key encryption based GAEN context encoding
Infected phone Y emits
( RPIy , RPublicKey, Encrypt(RPublicKey, GPSy) )
Healthy phone X , over BLE, receives this
( RPIy , RPublicKey, Encrypt(RPublicKey, GPSy) )
and stores it locally
If infected, Y uploads (DailyKeyy , PrivateKeyy)
With GAEN, Healthy phone X , downloads (DailyKeyy , PrivateKeyy) X from DailyKeyy , generates
{RPIy}
X finds the corresponding entry
( RPIy , RPublicKey, and Encrypt(RPublicKey, GPSy) )
X obtains GPSy by
Decrypt( PrivateKeyy , Encrypt(RPublicKey, GPSy) )
(b) Using Symmetric key encryption - Algo Steps
This is our recommended algorithm with minimal change to GAEN
This approach does not change anything about the uploading of DailyKey. It changes
the BLE payload to include GPS encrypted with DailyKey. The Encrypt method could
be AES (key size can be adjusted to use standard 128 or 256 bit size).
Algorithm 3: Symmetric key encryption based GAEN context encoding
Infected phone Y emits
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy , GPSy) )
Healthy phone X , over BLE receives the same, and stores it locally
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy , GPSy) )
Once diagnosed as infected, phone Y uploads its (DailyKeyy)
As part of GAEN, the Healthy phone X , downloads (DailyKeyy)
From DailyKeyy , phone X generates its RPIy
X Identifies the corresponding entry (RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy , GPSy))
X Extracts GPSy by
Decrypt( DailyKeyy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy , GPSy) )
(c) Using Symmetric key encryption and consent after infection
We allow a consent mechanism after the broadcast. The user may have consented
to broadcast BLE Ids, and also shared their encrypted GPS. But the infected user
may change their opinion to share only the BLE, and not allow the healthy user to
decrypt their GPS location. User keeps a ‘ConsentSecret’ code, and this is appended
to the DailyKey1. The RPI is derived from DailyKey, and hence BLE decoding
is not impacted. But GPS is encrypted with the key that appends DailyKeyy with
ConsentSecret. If the inflected user refuses to upload the ConsentSecret, the broadcast
encrypted GPS coordinates cannot be recovered. Rest of the protocol is the same as
4(b) above.
1alternatively one also could perform an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation of DailyKey and ConsentSecret
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Algorithm 4: Symmetric key encryption based GAEN context encoding
Infected phone Y emits
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , GPSy) )
(|| refers to the concatenation operator, for cryptographic reasons, it is advised to use XOR instead)
Healthy phone X , over BLE, receives the same, and stores it locally
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , GPSy) )
Once diagnosed as infected, they shall upload their (DailyKey, ConsentSecret), where
‘ConsentSecret’ is a unique secret key for allowing consent to be provided for decrypting location
context, or just provide exposure notificationa.
With GAEN, Healthy phone X , downloads (DailyKeyy , ConsentSecrety)
From DailyKeyy , reconstructs RPI_y
Find the corresponding entry
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , GPSy) )
Extracts GPSy by
Decrypt( DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety ,
Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , GPSy) )
aFor brevity we are keeping ConsentSecret here as a non-rotating unique secret key, but this can be changed
in the upcoming version of the draft
(d) Encrypted and Blurred GPS and post-infection Consent
This is our recommended algorithm if GPS is supported only in BLE payload.
This does not change anything about the uploading of DailyKey. It rather changes the
BLE payload to include a Blurred GPS encrypted with DailyKey. It allows infected
user to change the Consent as frequently as DailyKey is changed. Currently, DailyKey
changes per day, but in the future, they may change more frequently as in PACT,
allowing more fine grained Consent by the infected user.
Algorithm 5: Symmetric key encryption based GAEN context encoding with blurred location
Infected phone Y emits
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , FGPSy) )
(|| refers to the concatenation operator) and FGPSy is quantized GPS. Quantization based blurring of
location can be fixed, or vary from 100’s of meters to 1km depending on the population density
around that location.
Healthy phone X , over BLE, receives the same, and stores it locally
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , FGPSy) )
Once diagnosed as infected, they upload (DailyKey, ConsentSecret), where ‘ConsentSecret’ is a
unique secret key for allowing consent to be provided for decrypting location context or just provide
exposure notification.
With GAEN, Healthy phone X , downloads (DailyKeyy , ConsentSecrety)
From DailyKeyy , reconstructs RPIy
Find the corresponding entry
( RPIy , Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , FGPSy) )
Extracts FGPSy by
Decrypt( DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety ,
Encrypt(DailyKeyy || ConsentSecrety , FGPSy) )
Which is a blurred location that is enough to provide context for the user, but does not provide the
exact location.
Benefits
• Only DailyKey is uploaded as in GAEN, so no change in upload protocol
• A minor change in the BLE payload
• GPS (encrypted) is available only to the proximate phone, so there is little or no risk to
a non-proximate person
• GPS history is invisible
Challenges
• BLE payload increases but GAEN payload has plenty of space
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4 Discussion
We consider three possible levels of attack (The three levels are not mutually exclusive):
On-the-fly attack
This scheme of attack is performed by an attacker acting either as a Healthy person or a future-infected
person. They can potentially do two kind of attacks:
• Snoop on information.
• Spread wrong information through the Bluetooth transmission.
Post processing attack
• In this setting of attack, the attacker tries to make sense out of encrypted and unencrypted
information available after collection on their phone or force someone else to show these
information present on their phone.
Distributed multi party attack
• In this scheme, multiple individuals align together to share their data with each other in a
distributed way to attack the secrecy and privacy of individuals or groups of individuals.
There are different threat actors against whom protection is required:
Nosy person looking at stored GPS trails because visualization is easy
• Can force the user to open the app and show any data visible on the screen.
Hacker looking at stored GPS trails if available in raw format somewhere in the app
• Can reverse engineer their own app to inject code on top of APIs (This is only possible by
jailbreaking the iOS and rooting the Android OS).
• Can perform packet captures and snooping.
• Can not force the user to open app and share data with the attacker.
State actors reverse engineering information using poorly encrypted trails (using side channel)
• Combines the capabilities of the above actors and in addition can leverage multiple sources
and supercomputing capabilities for cryptanalysis.
From the GPS location, for an added context, the user may need to call a reverse geocoding API to
find the street address or name of the business there. If performed naively, this API call will leak user
location. The easiest way to resolve would be to perform regional map caching but this approach is
beyond the scope of this document.
5 Conclusion
In this proposal we have outlined several ways of allowing context-enabled contact tracing. We
believe the context of location and time will allow citizens to take informed decisions and reduce
panic.
In the spirit of respecting privacy, allowing consent, and delivering context within the Exposure
Notification service, we advocate for the adoption of Proposal 4(b).
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